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REPRESENTATIVE/SENATOR TRUMP?
Gary Lawson*
21 CHAPMAN L. REV. – (2018) (forthcoming)
Abstract
The American presidency is a much more powerful office in 2017 than was contemplated
by the Constitution of 1788. In large measure, that is because Congress has unconstitutionally
subdelegated many of its legislative powers to the President. The President thus effectively
functions as the Congress to a significant degree, which not only perverts the constitutional
structure but also significantly raises the stakes of presidential elections. There is no good
reason to expect Congress or the courts to stem the tide of subdelegation. Presidents, however,
have a number of tools available to resist, and even reverse, that tide. While there is every
reason to doubt the general willingness of presidents to turn down grants of authority in the
name of an abstract document, there might – just might – be some perhaps counterintuitive
reasons to think that President Trump may be more willing than other presidents to take the lead
in reining in executive power.

The 2016 presidential election sent many people, including many otherwise seemingly
sensible people, completely over the edge. College and university campuses en masse set up
counseling services for disappointed students, and I suspect that many faculty and administrators
probably “used” those services at least vicariously. Former friends were ostracized – or, even
worse, “unfriended” on Facebook – for the heinous sin of voting for Donald Trump. Ordinarily
sober scholars describe President Trump’s election as a symptom of “constitutional rot.” 1 At my
own institution, at a post-election panel on which I participated as the faculty’s token knuckledragger, student questions focused largely on how President Trump could be removed from
office – several months before he actually assumed that office. A list of anecdotes of this kind
could go on for quite a while.
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This article was prepared for a symposium
sponsored by the Chapman Law Review on “Constraining the Executive Branch,” and I thank the editors of that
journal for inviting me to participate. I am grateful to R.J. Pestritto and Joe Postell for helpful suggestions, though
they bear no responsibility for anything that I say here.
1

See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot and Constitutional Crisis, -- MARYLAND L. REV. (2017) (forthcoming).
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In all fairness to my grieving colleagues and students, I feel their pain. A lot of us sucked
it up, without any school-provided puppies, for the eight years of the Obama Administration, but
it was a thoroughly miserable time for anyone concerned about individual freedom. And
although I did not vote for George W. Bush in 2000 – I voted for Libertarian Harry Browne – I
vividly remember that, at one brief moment during election night, I actually felt physically ill
when it looked like the execrable Al Gore might ride his fevered fantasies about feverish planets
into the White House. Presidential elections seem to matter a great deal to a lot of people.
From a constitutionalist standpoint, 2 this is something of a puzzle. The United States
Constitution simply does not appear to make the President all that important a figure. To be
sure, in times of war, the President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 3 but the
Constitution gives Congress the powers to “declare War,” to “grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal,” to “make Rules regarding Captures,” to “raise and support Armies,” to “provide and
maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces,” and to provide for “calling forth” and “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia.” 4 Congress actually has most of the constitutional war powers – so much so that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause was necessary to foreclose an inference that Congress also has the

2

By “constitutionalist” I mean nothing more linguistically complex than “by reference to and in accordance with
the meaning of the United States Constitution.” That meaning was fixed - -at least for the original Constitution and
quite possibly for amendments as well -- in 1788, in the sense that the criteria for determining the referents of the
concepts in the Constitution are determined by the cognitive framework of a reasonable reader in 1788. See Gary
Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or, Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457
(2016); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006).
3

I believe that this authority comes from the Vesting Clause of Article I rather than from the more specific
Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States”), which simply confirms the President’s “executive Power” to command the
military, but that point is incidental to the present argument.
4

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
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unenumerated but implied power to control troop movements. 5 Furthermore, while the
President’s “executive Power” 6 gives him 7 control over the law enforcement machinery, that
power is subject to duties to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” 8 and to carry out
executive responsibilities in accordance with fiduciary principles. 9 More fundamentally,
executive power is, in all but a very small set of contexts, a purely implementational power that
comes into play only to execute law that is provided from sources external to the executive. 10
The President can also grant pardons, 11 convene and adjourn Congress, 12 and, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, make appointments and treaties, 13 but it is hard to see how powers of
this kind could generate Caesarian nightmares.
The sum total of constitutional presidential powers is far from trivial; the American
President is and always was a formidable constitutional figure. 14 But it is not necessarily a life-

5

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 ILL. L. REV. 1, 29-30.

6

U.S. CONST. § 1, cl. 1.

7

The Constitution consistently refers to the President by a generic male pronoun. I therefore follow that practice,
without endorsing it.
8

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

9

For a book-length defense of the proposition that all constitutional powers, including the executive power, are
fiduciary powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). For an article-length defense of a duty of care on the part of federal officials, and
therefore of a presidential duty of care in the execution of the laws, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, By Any Other
Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. – (2017)
(forthcoming).
10

See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
of Law Clause, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. – (forthcoming).

11

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1.

12

Id. § 3.

13

Id. § 2, cl. 2.

14

See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL
EXECUTIVE (2015).
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alteringly huge sum either. Even if one believes, as I emphatically do, that the Article II Vesting
Clause grants the President all power that falls within the conceptual category of “executive
Power,” 15 the conceptual lines of the power limit its scope. Possessing the “executive Power”
does not allow the President unilaterally to take over steel mills in order to help a war effort, 16
and it does not allow the President to order federal courts to dismiss pending cases in order to
promote foreign policy goals. 17 If one looks at the presidency through a constitutional lens, it is
hard to see why people would get as emotionally charged as they do about who occupies that
office. As a matter of original meaning, it just would not make that much of a difference in most
people’s lives. It probably matters more who is mayor of one’s city – and perhaps even who is
on the local zoning board.
As a matter of political and social reality rather than original meaning, of course, strong
reactions to presidential elections are more understandable. The modern presidency bears little
relationship to the office created by the Constitution of 1788. 18 Presidents today matter far more
than they should, if one’s touchstone is the Constitution. For one thing, presidents have, with the
blessing of Congress, assumed powers of at best dubious constitutional lineage on everything

15

See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 5, at 22-43. For the most powerful rebuttal to that position, see Robert G.
Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting Clause” – Evidence from EighteenthCentury Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2009).

16

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (correctly so holding).

17

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (not doing quite as well as did Youngstown, and indeed
pretty much making a botch of everything).

18
It is conventional to use 1789 as the starting date for the United States Constitution. That is the correct date for
when a fully functioning government under the Constitution, including a sworn-in Congress and President, first
appeared. The Constitution, however, became law for the ratifying states on June 21, 1788 (or at most shortly
thereafter), and at least some important portions of the Constitution were effective as of the summer of 1788. See
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001).
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from uses of military force 19 to the unilateral establishment of military governments in peacetime
within the United States. 20 For another thing, federal courts have routinely assumed powers far
beyond anything plausibly attributable to the “judicial Power” 21 conferred by the Constitution, so
the power to appoint federal judges has acquired significance beyond anything contemplated in
the eighteenth century. But, most importantly, in modern times the election of the American
President effectively elects the federal legislature as well. That is because the executive has
become, for all practical purposes, the legislative department (at least when the judicial
department chooses not to assume that authority). Modern executive action, through regulations,
adjudications, and enforcement decisions, creates law that often has far more effect on people’s
lives than does the entire mass of congressional legislation. Congress has fostered that
development by delegating – or, more precisely, subdelegating 22 -- much of its legislative
authority to the executive department via open-ended statutes that essentially instruct executive
actors to go forth and do good. A great many federal statutes make lawmakers, not laws. As a
consequence, presidential elections determine far more than the Constitution of 1788 ever had in
mind. It is no wonder that people get so invested in them.
That level of investment is potentially a bad thing in several respects. It is
constitutionally bad, because it reflects a perversion of the constitutional design. It is socially
bad if one believes that politics should not matter so much that people turn on each other for
19

See Gary Lawson, Inigo Montoya Goes to War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364-67 (2015) (describing constitutional
controversies over the scope of presidential power to initiate hostilities).
20

That happened? Yep, that happened. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution:
Governing without Authority, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 581 (2001).
21

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

22

See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014) (explaining that the constitutional
“delegation” problem is really a subdelegation problem, because Congress was delegated the legislative power in the
first instance).
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supporting different candidates and policies. And it might be intellectually bad, because people
who care too much about things do not always think clearly and logically about them.
Part One of this essay very briefly catalogues the extent to which the American
presidency has effectively become the American Congress through subdelegation of legislative
authority. Part Two equally briefly explains why that is a constitutional perversion. Part Three
suggests, contrary to the fears of many who are in the throes of Trump Derangement Syndrome,
how the Trump presidency may present the best opportunity in generations to reverse the trend
of subdelegation and begin the long process of reining in executive power. Ironically, the
change agent, if any change actually happens, is likely to be President Trump.
In no event do I expect the presidency of 2020 to look anything like the presidency of
1788. But for the first time in a long time, there is a chance that one might see some movement
on that front toward rather than away from the United States Constitution.

I.

“Meet the New Boss”

The American presidency has grown in power since 1788 for many reasons, and it would
require someone better versed than I in both history and political science to describe and analyze
them all. 23 But one of those reasons obviously dwarfs in magnitude all of the others: Congress
has essentially designated the President as its substitute legislature. The expansion of
presidential power through subdelegation of legislative authority is so enormous that any attempt

23
For an outstanding effort at such an account by someone better versed than I in both history and political science,
see JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT (2017). Professor Postell’s book is an indispensable supplement, and in some cases antidote, to
Professor Jerry Mashaw’s seminal book on early administrative law. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).

6

to restrain executive power that does not address the subdelegation problem head-on is like
putting band-aids on Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid after their final encounter with the
Mexican police. The federal executive now functions as the federal legislature for many, and
perhaps even most, practical purposes. Federal law, in the modern world, is largely an executive
construct. The observation is common enough to be almost mundane. As Professor Mila Sohoni
aptly summarized the conventional wisdom:
Due to gridlock and partisanship, Congress is less able to act as an effective
lawmaker and hence as an institution that actually authorizes and controls agency
action. With respect to some statutes, as Professors David Barron and Todd
Rakoff have pointed out, Congress has conferred primary custodianship over the
shape and structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving agencies the
power to waive and alter key statutory requirements. In other areas, as Professors
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have argued in the context of immigration law,
the accretion of complex statutory schemes and the opacity of legislative intent
have together produced a system of “de facto delegation” that effectively transfers
lawmaking power to the executive branch. 24
Professor Adrian Vermeule put it even more succinctly: “the executive and administrative sector
of the state . . . often overshadows the classical institutions of the Constitution of 1789
altogether.” 25
There is no uniquely correct way to measure the relative influence of legislative and
executive -- and, for that matter, judicial -- action in the creation of federal law. But even crude
metrics tell an important story. At the end of 2012, the number of pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations exceeded the number of pages in the United States Code by a factor of nearly four. 26
Notwithstanding the numerous problems, vectoring in somewhat different directions, with this
comparison – the Statutes at Large rather than the United States Code is the better measure of
24

Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701
(2017) (footnotes omitted)
25

ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 3 (2016).

26

See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J. LEGAL METRICS 89, 99 (2015).
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congressional lawmaking, many regulations simply parrot statutory language and thus add
nothing to the legal baseline, 27 gross volume numbers do not convey information about relative
importance, and an enormous amount of federal law is made through executive adjudication
rather than executive rulemaking and thus does not show up in measures of the CFR – there is
something striking about the raw figures comparing statutes and regulations. At the very least, it
constitutes a piece of concrete evidence, if any is actually needed, that executive lawmaking is
central to modern governance.
Casual anecdotalism 28 sheds further light on the relative importance of executive and
legislative action in the creation of federal law. Two of the most important statutes enacted
during the Obama Administration – The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 29 and the
Dodd-Frank Act 30 – consume thousands of pages of text between them, but they are both
toothless in important respects until implemented through significant regulatory action. As with
most modern regulatory statutes, they frequently authorize executive agencies to make law rather
than prescribe rules of conduct for executive agencies to implement.
Consider, as just one example, some interlocking provisions from the Affordable Care
Act (ACA). 31 One of the central concepts underlying the ACA is the “qualified health plan,”

27

Such “parroting” regulations could add to the legal baseline if they were given deference by courts. But
regulations that simply repeat what is said in statutes do not receive deference. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006) To be sure, regulations do not seem to need to differ much from statutory language in order to avoid the
“anti-parroting” rule of Gonzalez. See Plateau Mining Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 519
F.3d 1176, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2008).
28

Yes, it is a word. I looked it up.

29

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
31

For an interesting discussion of subdelegation of legislative authority under the Dodd-Frank Act and other
securities laws, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017).
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which is the only kind of plan that can be sold on the ACA exchanges. It is therefore vital under
the statute to know what makes a health care plan “qualified.” The basic statutory definition of a
qualified health plan is one that “has in effect a certification . . . that such plan meets the criteria
for certification described in section 18031(c) of this title.” 32 The criteria for certification
prescribed by section 18031(c) are: “The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall, by
regulation, establish criteria for the certification of health plans as qualified health plans.” 33 In
other words, the statute does not establish the criteria but instructs an executive official to
provide them. To be sure, the statute then sets out nine considerations that must be part of that
executive prescription, but those considerations are basically drivel, 34 much as were the statutory
“constraints” in the National Industrial Recovery Act 35 or the directions to the United States
Sentencing Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 36 The ACA also makes clear
that a qualified health plan must “provide[] the essential health benefits package described in
section 18022(a).” 37 It is anticlimactic to point out that section 18022(a) reads in relevant part:
“[T]he term ‘essential health benefits package’ means, with respect to any health plan, coverage

See also Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 566 (2017) (noting that the DoddFrank Act contains “398 specific calls in the statute for regulatory agencies, including the newly created Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting vague concepts such as ‘unfairness’ by financial institutions,
and ‘systemic risk.’) (footnote omitted)
32

42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (A) (2012).

33

Id. § 18031(c)(1).

34

See id. § 18031(c)(1) (A)-(I).

35

See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534-35 (1935).

36

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-77 (1989).

37

42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B). The plan must also be provided by a properly licensed insurer. See id.
§ 18021(a)(1)(C).
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that . . . provides for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] under subsection (b).” 38
These provisions are noteworthy in modern times for being more specific than one has
come to expect from major congressional legislation. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, 39 one of the most famous (or infamous) legislative legacies to emerge from the
second Bush Administration, handed the Secretary of the Treasury three quarters of a trillion
dollars with which to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms
and conditions as are determined by the Secretary.” “Troubled assets,” in case anyone wonders,
are mortgages and “any other financial instrument that the Secretary . . . determines the purchase
of which is necessary to promote financial market stability . . . .” 40 Throw on such old standards
that populate the United States Code as the Communications Act of 1934 41 and the Clean Air
Act 42 and one can see that much modern legislation does not make law but merely designates
executive agents as lawmakers. 43 The President, as the ultimate repository of all executive

38

Id. § 18022(a)(1).

39

Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 26 U.S.C.).

40

12 U.S.C. §§ 5211, 5202 (2012). The subdelegation problem was just one of many constitutional infirmities
with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (or TARP). See Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution under a TARP, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (2010).
41
47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission shall grant broadcast licenses
to applicants “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby”).
42

42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) ( providing that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall set
primary air quality standards “the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based
on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” ).
43

For a less consequential, but no less legally significant, example, consider the law underlying the events in Yates
v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015). Captain Yates threw overboard some undersized grouper that he had caught
in the Gulf of Mexico, and he was prosecuted for concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct,
or influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). The Yates decision in the Supreme Court focused on
whether fish were “tangible object[s]” within the meaning of this statute, but consider for a moment why Captain
Yates felt the need to throw his fish overboard. What federal statute prescribed the maximum length of red grouper
for American fishing vessels? There was no such statute; the only relevant statute made it illegal “to violate . . . any
regulation or permit” issued by the National Marine Fisheries Services. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(A) (2012). For a more
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power, thereby becomes the de facto Congress. The President and other executive agents make
the law. President Trump is thus also, over a staggeringly large range of cases, Representative
Trump and Senator Trump to boot – with no requirements of quorums, cloture, or majority votes
to stand in the way of his lawmaking.
To be sure, in the real world, it is “other executive agents” far more than it is the
President who makes the law. The federal executive apparatus is so enormous that even the most
committed President can control only a tiny fraction of what actually goes on within it.
Congressional subdelegation thus really creates an alternative multi-member Congress within the
executive whose institutional functioning is too complex to be captured by any simple analogy.
Nonetheless, as a formal matter, all executive power is lodged in the President, even if he cannot
always effectively exercise it in the face of a “deep state” that has its own agenda(s).
Of course, there are serious limits even to this expanded executive power, as recent (as of
July 2017) events concerning efforts to repeal or amend the ACA demonstrate. The President
cannot simply wave a law into or out of existence. The legislature is not irrelevant. But the
constitutional role of the legislature is not to be “not irrelevant.” It is to make the law, which is
then executed by the President and other executive agents. Much of the time, that is simply not
how it works.

II.

“Why Should I Care, Why Should I Care?”

Is it really a constitutional problem if the President makes the law? To ask the question is
to answer it, at least as a matter of original meaning. Indeed, there are few propositions of
detailed account of the federal “law” – all stemming from executive regulations -- regarding the permissible size of
Gulf of Mexico red grouper, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 108-09.
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constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the unconstitutionality of subdelegations
of legislative authority. I have spent much of the past quarter century defending that claim, and I
will not repeat those extensive arguments here beyond the brief references in this section.
One can discern a constitutional principle against subdelegation of legislative authority
through any number of convergent lines of reasoning. The basic principle of enumerated powers
reserves all “legislative powers herein granted” to Congress and thus denies them to executive
(or judicial) agents, 44 whose enumerated powers do not include the power to legislate. A law
subdelegating legislative power to the President or an executive official would not be “necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers. 45 To let the President make rather than
execute law would violate the principle of legality that has been part of the Anglo-American
legal tradition since the Magna Carta and that underlies the constitutional idea of due process of
law. 46 And, most powerfully and fundamentally, subdelegation violates the fiduciary principles
that underlie the Constitution. The United States Constitution is most aptly characterized as a
kind of fiduciary instrument, 47 and the background principles of interpretation for the document
are therefore at least partially defined by the background rules for interpretation of eighteenthcentury fiduciary instruments. 48 One of the best-established eighteenth-century fiduciary duties
is the requirement that agents exercising delegated discretionary authority personally exercise

44

See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180-81 (7th ed. 2016).

45

See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242-67 (2005); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327,
345-52 (2002).
46

See Lawson, supra note 10, at --.

47

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 49-75.

48

See id. at 8-11, 76-78.
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rather than subdelegate that authority. 49 Accordingly, if a fiduciary instrument is to allow the
agent to subdelegate discretionary authority, 50 the instrument needs specifically to provide for
such authority, at least where authority to subdelegate is not incidental to the granted power. The
United States Constitution contains no specific authorization for the subdelegation of legislative - or, for that matter, of executive or judicial -- power. As Guy Seidman and I have said:
There is no affirmative grant of power in the Constitution to subdelegate
legislative authority. The necessary and proper clause, the only plausible source
of such authority, only authorizes incidental powers, and the power to subdelegate can be incidental only with respect to ministerial tasks, or where
delegation is necessary in a strict sense, or where there was in the eighteenth
century an established custom or usage of subdelegation. In other words,
understanding the agency-law foundations of the Constitution confirms what
textual, intratextual, and structural analysis all reveal: Congress may not delegate
its legislative power to other actors, be they executive agents, judicial agents, state
governments, foreign sovereigns, or private parties. The rule against
subdelegation of legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules
one can imagine. 51
Outside of governance of occupied territory during wartime 52 and the constitutionally specified
power to make treaties, 53 the President is not supposed to make laws. That is the job of the
constitutionally vested legislative authority. The President is supposed to execute, and faithfully
execute, the laws provided by others.
The real question is not whether Congress can subdelegate discretionary authority – the
short answer is “no.” The real question is what constitutes an act of subdelegation. Surely

49

See id. at 113-17.

50

Agents are generally free, absent specification in the governing instrument, to subdelegate the performance of
ministerial tasks.
51

Id. at 117.

52

See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 47-51 (2004).
53

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Congress cannot subdelegate its formal Article I, section 7 power to vote on bills, but suppose
Congress exercises that formal power by enacting Article I, section 7 laws that tell executive
agents to go find problems and then fix them. Does the constitutional anti-subdelegation
principle control the content of the laws that Congress can enact? Does it forbid granting
executive (and judicial) agents a certain kind, quantity, and quality of discretion, even if those
grants fulfill the formal procedural requirements for constitutional lawmaking?
Some say no. For example, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeuele in the early 2000s argued
that Congress can only be said to subdelegate its power when it transfers its formal authority
under Article I, section 7; it can never be said to subdelegate when it vests substantive authority
in executive agents, no matter how open-ended the grant of authority may be. 54 I have an articlelength response to that argument elsewhere, 55 and that response is both supported and supplanted
by subsequent work on the fiduciary underpinnings of the Constitution. 56 Congress is not
granted a general legislative power. It is charged with specific tasks and given tools with which
to perform those tasks. Those charges call for the exercise of discretionary authority, and in the
absence of specific authorization to subdelegate those authorities, Congress must exercise those
powers itself. Under basic fiduciary principles, Congress cannot pass off the exercise of those
discretionary acts to others, even by enactments that follow the form of Article I, section 7:
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen clauses
contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such actions as to “lay
54

See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721; Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003).

55

See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 45.

56
See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 107-26. I would be remiss if I did not thank Robert Natelson for
making me aware of the importance of understanding the fiduciary character of the Constitution. My long-time
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and collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,” “coin . . ., regulate . . ., and fix,”
“provide,” “establish,” “promote . . . by securing,” “constitute,” “define and
punish,” “declare . . ., grant . . ., and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,”
“provide and maintain,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,”
“provide for calling forth,” “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,”
and “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” . . . . Exactly
who, in this governmental scheme, is supposed to be doing the lion's share of the
laying and collecting, borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, regulating,
fixing, providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining and
punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising and supporting,
providing and maintaining, making Rules for the Government and Regulation of,
providing for calling forth, providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and
exercising exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over? 57
Just as not everything done by presidents through procedurally proper means is necessarily a
constitutionally valid exercise of “executive Power,” and not everything done by courts through
procedurally proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid exercise of “judicial Power,”
not everything done by Congress through procedurally proper means is necessarily a
constitutionally valid exercise of the various “legislative Powers herein granted” with which
Congress is vested. The principle against subdelegation is substantive, not formal.
To be sure, the conceptual lines between the constitutionally vested legislative and
executive powers are not always crisp. It does not necessarily violate the Constitution for
Congress to pass a law that requires some measure of interpretation. Figuring out the where the
executive power ends and the legislative power begins “is a subject of delicate and difficult
inquiry,” 58 and James Madison drily observed that “[q]uestions daily occur in the course of
practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest
adepts in political science.” 59
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That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison from categorically
declaring that various powers of government are “in their nature . . . legislative,
executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop John Adams from stating that the “three
branches of power have an unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in
every society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive
authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on a
separation of them in the frame of government . . . .” Nor did it prevent many
state constitutions of the founding era from including separation-of-powers
clauses that expressly distinguished, again without express definitions, the
legislative from the executive from the judicial powers. Nor did it prevent the
United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme of governance on the
distinctions among those powers. However difficult it may be at the margins to
distinguish those categories of power from each other, the founding generation
assumed that there was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one
could discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative
meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without reference to
some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political scientists (adept or
otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful or confusing. 60
As Chief Justice John Marshall memorably put it: “The line has not been exactly drawn which
separate those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.” 61 But wherever and however that
line is properly drawn, huge swaths of modern law go beyond any plausible boundaries. Going
forth and doing good pursuant to a statute that instructs the executive to go forth and do good is
not an exercise of “executive Power” under any sensible eighteenth-century understanding of
that concept, and that simple observation is enough to sweep in many of the statutes at the core
of modern law. Nor is enactment of such a law a valid exercise of legislative power. Congress,
under the Constitution, must enact laws, not empty collections of words.
This is as good a place as any to respond to a recent critique of this argument from Adrian
Vermeule. Professor Vermeule maintains that “the institutional innovations that appall Lawson
60
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23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.

16

[such as subdelegation of legislative authority] were themselves generated by the very system of
lawmaking-by-separation-of-powers that he wants to defend. Lawson never comes to grip with
the problem of abnegation, the brute fact that everything Lawson deems inconsistent with the
Constitution of 1789 emerged through and by means of the operation of that very Constitution,
not despite it.” 62 More broadly:
We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by the sustained
and bipartisan action of Congress and the President over time; that is supervised
and checked by the President as it operates; and that has been blessed by an
enduring bipartisan consensus on the Supreme Court. The classical Constitution
of separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three branches,
itself gave rise to the administrative state. When critics of the administrative state
call for a return to the classical Constitution, they do not seem to realize they are
asking for the butterfly to return to its own chrysalis. If political legitimacy is not
to be found in this long-sustained and judicially-approved joint action of Congress
and the President, the premier democratically elected and democratically
legitimate bodies in our constitutional system, and the real complaint of the critics
is not that the administrative state is illegitimate, but that our whole constitutional
order is intrinsically misguided. 63
This argument rests on a distressingly common error: it conflates arguments about textual
meaning with arguments about political and moral legitimacy. I have in the past made, and am
here making, no claims whatsoever about the political legitimacy vel non of the administrative
state, the Constitution in general, or any form of governmental organization. As I have said
elsewhere: “I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose to say nothing
about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral concept, and I am not a political or moral theorist
. . . . To be sure, political legitimacy is an important thing about which to think. It just is not
the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not to venture outside that relatively narrow zone
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of comfort in professional academic work.” 64 My only claim, here and elsewhere, is that
subdelegation of legislative authority is contrary to the meaning of the Constitution. I declare
nothing about what any real-world person ought to do with that information or how any past,
present, or future political actors should respond to it. 65 And I emphatically make no claim that
constitutional infidelity is a distinctively modern phenomenon. The very first statute enacted by
the very first Congress was wildly, flagrantly, and knowingly unconstitutional. 66 So are a great
many statutes that have been enacted by past and present congresses, signed and enforced by past
and present presidents, and upheld and applied by past and present judges. That is not
“hubris.” 67 That is empirical fact – as all claims of constitutional meaning are claims of
empirical fact. It may or may not be an intellectually interesting empirical fact, depending upon
one’s intellectual interests, but it is an empirical fact. In other words, in my professional guise, I
do not see myself as a “critic[] of the administrative state.” I see myself as an objective
expositor of the Constitution. 68 As a straightforward interpretative matter, the Constitution
forbids the subdelegation of legislative authority, no matter how socially inevitable, normatively
desirable, or politically legitimate it may be. One can certainly elect to choose social
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inevitability, normative desirability, or political legitimacy over the Constitution, but that has no
bearing on what the Constitution actually says.

III.

“You Need a New Song”

Assuming that one regards unconstitutional subdelegation as a problem (and I do not
maintain that anyone must so assume, so everything beyond this point is in the form of a
hypothetical imperative), it is beyond pointless to look to Congress for solutions to that problem.
Congress created the problem by giving away its authority in the first place. Psychologists,
historians, and political scientists are better situated than I to say why this has happened, but
some fairly obvious considerations come to mind. “By delegating the ultimate decision to an
agency, Congress can take credit for doing something while dodging the blame from
disappointed constituents.” 69 Realistically, though, can this kind of transparent ploy actually
work to improve legislators’ electoral prospects? Evidently so: “[P]olitical scientists have
documented the value of ‘credit-claiming’ and ‘position-taking’ in legislators' efforts to
maximize the probability of re-election.” 70 Moreover, subdelegation has efficiency benefits for
legislators: “Legislators delegate authority in order to reduce various costs of legislating, which
allows them to legislate more private goods. Stated differently, delegation reduces the
legislator’s marginal cost of private-goods production . . . .” 71 It also offers efficiency of access
for interest groups: By “unbundling” specific items, such as energy regulation, from everything
69
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else on the legislative agenda, such as monetary policy, drug policy, and foreign trade, it allows
parties with concentrated interests to focus their attention on institutions (agencies) wholly
dedicated to their precise area of concern. It is not surprising that Congress and those who seek
to influence Congress would find subdelegation very attractive. 72
To be sure, there are occasional token thrusts in Congress to gain some measure of
legislative control over executive lawmaking. The Congressional Review Act, which is part of
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 73 provides a mechanism for
fast-track legislative cancellation of major agency rules, 74 and the statute has been employed
more than a dozen times in 2017 after being used only once in its first two decades. 75 A version
of the so-called REINS Act (for “Regulations from the Executive [I]n Need of Scrutiny”), which
would require Congress legislatively to approve major rules before they take effect, has made it
farther through Congress in 2017 than it has ever gone before, 76 though its prospects for ultimate
passage are dubious. Through all of this, however, the simple expedient of passing real statutes
instead of vague mush and/or amending the old enactments that are really subdelegations
masquerading as statutes is nowhere on the congressional agenda. Hence the first sentence of
this section. 77
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Nor can one plausibly rely on the courts to police legislative subdelegations. The
Supreme Court’s complete retreat from the field of subdelegation is too well known to require
elaborate summary. 78 Liberal and conservative jurisprudes disagree on many things, but they
have found common cause – or, more precisely, an overlapping consensus -- in capitulation to
congressional desire to subdelegate its authority. Some Justices fly the flag of surrender because,
on policy grounds, they want to grease the wheels of the administrative state. As a nearunanimous Supreme Court said with admirable candor (if perhaps less admirable lack of regard
for law): “[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job[?!] absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.” 79 Others flee the battlefield because of an extra-constitutional concern
about judicial discretion: “[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the
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courts.” 80 Although Justice Thomas has expressed some interest in enforcing a constitutional
ban on subdelegations 81 and Justice Gorsuch may be more receptive to such arguments than was
Justice Scalia, 82 no one seriously expects the federal courts to rise up and smite major portions of
the administrative state in the name of the Constitution of 1788.
That leaves, as the last line of constitutional defense, the President. 83 There is any
number of tools available to presidents to resist unconstitutional subdelegations, if they are
inclined to use those tools. Most obviously, presidents can veto proposed legislation that fails to
make law. Congress can override those vetoes with a two-thirds majority in each House, but a
presidential veto can be a serious roadblock to subdelegation. Moreover, the President could
issue a veto message communicating the constitutional grounds for the action and thereby raise
public awareness of Congress’s constitutional failure. The President could also recommend
legislation amending or repealing past laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate authority.
Appointing judges who take the Constitution seriously could also indirectly help in this regard.
Finally, and most dramatically (and therefore least plausibly), the President could refuse to
enforce laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power. Presidents have a power, and
duty, of executive review that is equal to, and derives from the same source as, the collateral
power of judicial review. 84 If courts are allowed, and indeed required, to refuse to give legal
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effect to unconstitutional laws, the same is true of presidents (and everyone else in the
constitutional order). At this point, however, the shade of Andrew Johnson will surely begin
whispering about the possible consequences of presidential nonenforcement of statutes on
constitutional grounds. A genuine constitutionalist will respond that the President nonetheless
has an unconditional obligation to the Constitution, consequences be damned. 85 Even if one
does not take this extreme tack, however, there is no obvious reason why presidents cannot, and
constitutionally should not, make use of the other tools at their disposal to resist subdelegation
All that is needed is the will to use those tools.
At first glance, it may seem even more absurd to rely on the President to police
subdelegations of legislative authority than to rely on Congress or the courts. Don’t such
subdelegations, by definition, increase the power of the executive, both absolutely and relative to
its chief institutional competitors? If Congress is willing to cede some, or even most, of its
authority to the President, who would expect the President to decline the offer?
As with the Spanish Inquisition, no one expects it. But, as with the Spanish Inquisition, it
just might appear anyway. To be sure, history is on the side of the skeptics. The Reagan
Administration made a great fuss over constitutional fidelity, especially in the realm of
separation of powers. In the 1980s, Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave voice to some
monumental, and monumentally important, constitutional principles dealing with the separation
of powers, such as departmentalism and the unitary executive. 86 The Justice Department was
filled with constitutional originalists who understood quite well that the Constitution does not

85

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (prescribing the presidential oath of office as: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”).

86

See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,
1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701 (2005).

23

authorize subdelegation of legislative authority. With all of that intellectual and political
firepower assembled, what was the number of bills vetoed by President Reagan on the ground
that they unconstitutionally subdelegated legislative power to the President? That would be zero.
The number of bills introduced or supported by the Reagan Administration to repeal or replace
old statutes that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power to the President? That would
also be zero. The number of such bills vetoed or championed, respectively, by either of the Bush
Administrations? Yep, zero again. (I assume that no one finds it necessary for me to repeat
these numbers for modern Democrat administrations.) All conventional grounds for judgment
suggest that the executive department is a central part of the problem of subdelegation of
legislative authority and likely the last place that one should look for a solution.
Enter Donald Trump. Exit conventional grounds for judgment.
Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump (and I confess that I have a higher regard for him
than do most of the people with whom I usually associate), one must acknowledge that the usual
rules of politics do not apply to him. Indeed, his election was, at least for many who voted for
him, precisely a pair of double-barreled middle fingers thrust into the face of political convention
(with a loud razzberry added for good measure). The fact that invoking a constitutional principle
against subdelegation of legislative authority would elicit shrieks of horror from the political and
cultural establishment would not necessarily deter President Trump from doing it. Indeed, it just
might be an added incentive.
The question is whether there is anything substantive that would or could motivate
President Trump to take a stand against legislative subdelegation, perhaps by vetoing proposed
legislation on constitutional subdelegation grounds and issuing a stinging veto message. Several
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considerations suggest – and I emphasize that I deliberately use the word “suggest” in its literal
and modest sense – that there might be.
First, President’s Trump’s key appointments to legal offices speak to a commitment to
constitutional first principles that exceeds that of any president in my lifetime. His first
appointment to the Supreme Court was Neil Gorsuch, who, as a court of appeals judge,
specifically raised the idea of reviving the subdelegation doctrine. 87 President Trump’s
nominations to the lower federal courts thus far also have originalists cheering, and maybe even
salivating. And both of his appointees to top executive department legal positions -- Attorney
General Jeff Sessions and White House Counsel Don McGahn – are long-time advocates (if not
necessarily consistent practitioners) of originalism. The pairing is significant. My recollection
from three-plus decades ago is that the Reagan Justice Department was more than occasionally at
odds with the White House Counsel’s Office, which had considerably less enthusiasm than did
Attorney General Meese and his staff for picking fights about broad structural principles. That
kind of internal conflict reduces the likelihood of bold action. If the Department of Justice and
White House Counsel’s Office are both strongly committed to originalism, they can speak with a
united front on subdelegation. No originalist can defend, with a straight face, the gross
subdelegations of legislative power that pervade modern government as consistent with the
Constitution. 88
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Second, all of the foregoing considerations suggest that President Trump is inclined to
defer, on legal and constitutional matters, to those who he regards as reliable experts on those
subjects. No one seriously believes that Donald Trump entered the political arena in 2015 with a
well-formed theory of constitutional interpretation in mind. Obviously, he has decided that
originalists are the go-to folks in this area. If, hypothetically, President Trump’s Attorney
General and White House Counsel both recommend a veto on constitutional grounds, it is not
absurd to imagine that President Trump would take that recommendation very seriously.
Third, White House strategist Steve Bannon declared in February 2017 that the Trump
Administration was committed to “deconstruction of the administrative state.” 89 The exact
meaning of the phrase is not important here. The significance for present purposes is that the
standard response to any attempt to revive a constitutional principle against subdelegation is to
complain that it would be an assault on the administrative state. 90 That certainly seemed to be an
important driver of the decision in Mistretta, and I have heard something like it from my
colleagues for decades. If Mr. Bannon truly speaks for the Administration on this point, it
suggests that the standard establishment response will not resonate all that well with the current
President. To be sure, there are nontrivial arguments to be made that the unbundling afforded by
subdelegation increases democratic responsiveness in some respects, 91 but these do not seem like
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arguments that will carry much weight with a constitutionalist who wants to deconstruct the
administrative state.
Fourth, every force in the legal universe is currently aligned to jump at the chance to
constrain executive power. The political, legal, and cultural establishments all despise the
current occupant of the White House. If there is ever going to be a time for limits on executive
power, this is it. And if those limits come from the White House itself, would the establishment
really find it within themselves to resist?
Perhaps there never will be a time for such limits. Certainly, those who think of
President Trump as a swaggering, overbearing, tin-plated dictator with delusions of godhood (or
perhaps even as a Denebian slime devil) 92 will regard as laughable the idea that he would turn
down power.

I am more inclined than many to think that Donald Trump cannot be written off

as a power-mad autocrat, but maybe the many are right. Maybe Adrian Vermeuele is right about
the inevitability of the administrative state; it certainly would not surprise me if he was right
about that. Perhaps, as with every other modern President before him, Donald Trump will
choose expanded executive power over the Constitution, and perhaps the establishment’s love
for the administrative state is stronger than its hatred for President Trump. But maybe, just
maybe, an odd combination of originalism, swamp draining, and the looming specter of Trumpas-Congress will lead to something that no one expects – maybe even something constitutionally
more significant than a comfy chair.
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